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TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOME CRITICS 
OF RELIGION BASED ON FEELING AND EMOTION 
FOLLOWING WILLIAM JAMES
KATJA THÖRNER
Abstract. In this paper I will show that you can distinguish two main types of 
argumentation in respect to feeling and emotions in the philosophy of religion 
of William James, which point to two different kind of criticism of religion. 
Especially in his early works, James argues that you may lawfully adopt religious 
beliefs on the basis of passional grounds. This argumentation points to a type of 
criticism of religion, which denies that beliefs based on such emotional grounds 
may be justified. In his famous study The Varieties of Religious Experience, James 
defines religious experience as an  experience of inner conversion, where the 
individual gets in touch with a higher self. The philosophical interpretation of 
religious experience points not at least to a type of criticism of religion in the 
tradition of Ludwig Feuerbach, which is known as the theory of projection.
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether emotion or feeling plays a decisive role in the 
formation of religious beliefs is connected closely to a kind of criticism of 
religion, which was famously framed by Ludwig Feuerbach in his work 
‘The Essence of Christianity’ (1841) and has gone down as the ‘theory of 
projection’ in the history of criticism of religion. The basic idea is that 
all speech of God is basically anthropology, for the properties, which 
are attributed to God or Gods by humans, are nothing else than human 
attributes projected to a higher being or higher beings. It is, or they are, 
considered as higher beings because human beings attribute to it/them 
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only the most sublime and noble properties. In this way human beings 
are creating ideal images of themselves, and as they are conscious of 
their own imperfectness they consider themselves to stand in an infinite 
distance to their God/Gods. Facing the Gods they have installed 
themselves, human beings, according to Feuerbach, regard themselves 
to be limited tiny creatures. Criticism of religion in this respect means to 
enlighten mankind about this inner process and to remind them of their 
own nobility and magnitude – of the divine in themselves. ‘Rather, every 
being is in and by itself infinite  – has its God, its highest conceivable 
being, in itself.’ (The Essence of Christianity, p. 7.1 Hereafter ‘EoCh’.) In 
the introduction of The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach emphasizes 
the high importance of the faculty of feeling in religion. Feeling is called 
‘the organ of the divine’ and ‘the noblest, the most excellent, i.e., the 
divine, in man’ (EoCh, p. 9). Without mentioning his name Feuerbach 
appeals in this passage to Schleiermacher and his definition of religion as 
‘feeling or intuition of the Universe’ in his work ‘On Religion: Speeches 
to its Cultured Despisers’.2 But at the same time he criticizes the idea 
that feeling is the organ of perception, which enables us to recognize the 
infinite divine nature of God. In this theory of religion feeling is not only 
the subjective part of the process of recognizing God, it ‘is declared to be 
itself the absolute, the divine’ (EoCh, p. 10). Only in the reflection can you 
separate feeling from his object. In reflection, the object is defined and 
also limited. For God is unlimited, the only definition of God following 
the antecedents steps could be that ‘God is pure, unlimited, free Feeling. 
Every other God, whom thou supposest, is a  God thrust upon thy 
feeling from without’ (EoCh, p. 10). In this mystic moment of immediate 
experience ‘feeling is atheistic’ from ‘the point of view of the orthodox 
form of belief, which is decisive as to the manner in which religion relates 
itself to an external object’ (EoCh, p. 10). Feeling in immediate presence 
‘denies an objective God – it is its own God’ (EoCh, p. 10).3
1 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, translated from the Second German 
Edition by Marian Evans (London: John Chapmann, 1854).
2 ‘Ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl.’ 
Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern (1799), in ibid., Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. I/2: Schriften aus der Berliner 
Zeit 1769-1799, hg. v. Günter Meckenstock (Berlin/New York: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 
1984), p. 213.
3 A similar approach to that of Feuerbach’s, inspired by Humanism and the idea of 
emancipation, in this respect nowadays is pursued by the representatives of the so-called 
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If atheistic feeling is his own God, theistic feeling could be defined 
as a feeling in which the difference between God and self is preserved. 
The epistemological question arising there is: Is it possible to hold on to 
the distinction between God and self in the moment of immediate and 
unlimited feeling? Or is it only in reflection that you separate feeling as 
the subject part of experience and God as his object with the result that 
God only could appear as limited, for always in some respect defined as 
object?
As I’ll show in the second chapter of this paper, James develops in 
his study Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) a concept of religious 
experience which is based on an  immediate feeling of the presence of 
a higher self. But although it reminds in this respect of the assertions in the 
introduction of Feuerbach’s ‘Essence of Christianity’, James’ conception 
isn’t atheistic at all. Whereas James also considers the mystical point of 
immediate feeling as one but not the only significant aspect of religious 
experience, he avoids the atheistic, by construing religious experience 
not in correspondence to sense-perception but to the experience to be 
confronted to a person as another self. In this perception of the other 
as a self, the difference between myself and the other is always present 
without considering the other as an  object. The cosmological and 
theological consequences of this conception of religious experience, 
or more precisely the experience of God as a higher self, are developed 
by James in his later work A  Pluralistic Universe (1909). James infers 
that if we consider God as a  person, which is able to communicate 
with finite persons like us, we have to think of God as finite too, for 
his power is limited by the free will of human beings. So the concept of 
religious experience as the experience of a higher self not only avoids the 
coincidence of God and the subject of religious experience, but also the 
coincidence of subjectivity and God in an idealistic way considered as 
the ‘Weltgeist’ (world spirit) or some related concepts. The latter at least 
is important to prevent, in some moral and humanistic respect: James 
shares with Feuerbach the intuition that it is inhuman to think of God as 
the Absolute in the meaning of a perfect, almighty and eternal being in 
contrast to human beings as determined, imperfect and sinful.
But even if it is possible to establish a  compelling epistemological 
model of religious experience, respectively of the experience of 
New-Atheists like Richard Dawkins, the French philosopher Michel Onfray or the 
British philosopher Christopher Hitchens.
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communicating with a higher self, named God, it is another question if 
this conception could be a reason to believe in God.
The question of whether feeling in the sense of an  immediate 
experience of God may function as a  foundation of religious belief 
in fact obviously couldn’t be denied, at least if you think of the rise of 
Pentecostals all over the world. Perhaps the special appeal of this kind 
of religion, where immediate and high emotional experiences are 
considered as a special witness of the truth of the belief, is due to the 
fact that traditional definition of the object of religious experience, in 
short the attributes of God, have lost their cognitive reasonableness 
and intelligibility. Or to say it in the words of Feuerbach: ‘But the object 
of feeling is become a matter of indifference, only because when once 
feeling has been pronounced to be the subjective essence of religion only, 
it in fact is also the objective essence of religion, though it may not be 
declared, at least directly, to be such.’ (EoCh, p. 9)
But philosophers do not ask if in fact people come to religious beliefs 
on the basis on high emotional experiences, but if it is reasonable to 
think of beliefs as being true if they are accompanied by intense feelings 
or emotional longings. It may be comprehensible that people become 
believers on such reasons. But to warrant religious beliefs in reference to 
the intensity of emotional experience, the overwhelming feeling of God’s 
presence or an inner need to belief is not an easy business, especially in 
a rationalistic tradition of thinking.
A  more sophisticated kind of rationalistic criticism of religion 
differentiates between religious beliefs which are based on pure feeling 
alone and such beliefs, which go along with special feelings, but are 
also intellectually understandable. A  contemporary representative of 
the latter point of view is Franz von Kutschera. In his book Was vom 
Christentum bleibt (What remains of Christianity), he argues for a ‘mature 
Christianity’, which refuses emotions like ‘to comfort mourning’ or ‘share 
happiness’ as honest motives for believing,4 if they function as the main 
motif of religious belief. A sober and mature Christianity which breaks 
loose from mythological ideas, which are able to produce immediately 
high emotions and deep feelings, presumably will stay for a  long time 
in the future of mankind, because it fits the modern mature person who 
always scrutinizes his own experiences and like to justify their beliefs to 
themselves. Also, other contemporary critics of religion like the German 
4 Franz von Kutschera, Was vom Christentum bleibt (Paderborn: Mentis, 2008), p. 142.
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philosophers Herbert Schnädelbach and Ernst Tugendhat consider the 
ideal of intellectual integrity as the crucial point, which keeps them 
away from religious belief. For them there is no possibility to believe 
without losing intellectual integrity. And to give other impulses a higher 
priority than reasoning in the case of religious belief is considered to 
be an obstacle to the ideal of intellectual integrity. The idea behind this 
conviction is that beliefs based on feelings and emotions are just illusions. 
To hold them to be true would be self-deluding. And the intellectual 
single-minded thinker never could delude himself.
In contrast to such a kind of criticism of religion, or more precisely 
abstinence of beliefs based on emotional longings or immediate feelings, 
I  will present in the first part of this paper the pragmatic version of 
justifying religious beliefs, as it is developed by William James in his 
famous paper of the year 1896 ‘The Will to Believe’. I will adduce some 
passages from the Principles of Psychology (1890) and some early papers 
on popular philosophy. In these articles, originating before his famous 
study Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), James construes religious 
belief also as an adherence to a conviction based on emotional affinity. 
Especially his article ‘The Will to Believe’ appeals to rigid rationalists of 
this time, like W. E. Clifford, who argues that a belief which is based on 
emotional grounds may in principle never held to be true. Against this 
position James argues that it is rather irrational to deny religious beliefs 
for being based on emotional grounds or for the reason that (some) 
human beings have the affinity to believe in God, a higher power or some 
similar things.
In the second part of the paper I will outline the cognitive aspect of 
religious feeling in James’ conception of religion. This model involves 
the idea of transcendental experience, which on the one hand is 
construed as a kind of experience of transcendence which is rooted on 
the consciousness of self. In this respect it can be seen in the tradition 
of Schleiermacher. On the other hand he opens up the immanent 
consequences in the concept of religious experience, which are implied 
in an idealistic tradition of philosophy to a realistic interpretation on the 
basis of his conception of ‘radical empiricism’. In respect to the first part 
of the paper, it will be asked whether the realistic interpretation of feeling 
in religious experience may refute the suspicion of being deluded or to 
have succumbed to an illusion by religious experience.
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I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
The article ‘The Will to Believe’ (1896) was written by James in his own 
words as an ‘essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt 
a believing attitude in religious matters’.5 In this text the acceptance of 
religious beliefs is defined as a decision in case of a ‘genuine option’. It is 
characterized by the following features:
At first it is defined as a  living option. This topic limits the circle 
of the people which could possibly be convinced by the following 
argumentation. The intended audience is called by James the ‘the saving 
remnant’, that means in biblical terms those who are capable of returning 
to God (see Isaiah 10:22). In the words of Max Weber, it may also be 
possible to speak of religious musical people (religiös musikalisch), who 
have the volition and are capable not only of adopting religious beliefs, 
but of making them their own. Secondly a genuine option is characterized 
as an unavoidable or forced option, that means there is only the option 
to be religious or to be non-religious and it is not possible to avoid this 
decision in one’s lifetime – to be an agnostic would be the same as to be 
a  non-religious, because faith wouldn’t be a  defining element of one’s 
life. Thirdly a genuine option is held to be seen as a momentous option 
because it is the only way to reach a most valuable good – not only after, 
but still in one’s lifetime.
The thesis James defends in ‘The Will to Believe’ is that in cases in 
which we have to make a genuine option and we are not able to make it 
on intellectual grounds, we are not only rationally justified to make the 
decision on passional grounds, but we have to decide on these reasons – 
just because in such cases there is no other option.
The thesis I  defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not 
only lawfully may, but must, decide an  option between propositions, 
whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds. (WB, p. 20)
This quote shows that James’ thesis includes another, fourth defining 
feature of a ‘genuine option’ in respect of religious beliefs: it is not possible 
to get convinced of their truth or untruth on intellectual grounds. That 
shows that James starts his argumentation on the basis introduced by Kant 
5 William James, ‘The Will to Believe’, in: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, The Works of William James, vol. 6 (MA/London: Harvard University 
Press, 1978), pp. 13-33 (p. 13). (Hereafter WB)
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in philosophy of religion: The existence of God cannot be demonstrated 
on intellectual grounds.
When we are confronted with a genuine option, it is always justified, 
James argues further, to hold that assumption to be true, of which we 
wish it would be true. Or to say it the other way around: There is no 
reason to choose the more unpleasant ‘truth’, only to avoid the risk of 
getting deluded by our own wishing and longings. The argument here 
is that religious beliefs mustn’t have to been considered as theoretical 
assumptions or explanations (not even as metaphysical assumptions), 
but as beliefs which will serve as a foundation for living or the grounding 
of our attitudes toward our whole life.
Our faculties of belief were not primarily given us to make orthodoxies 
and heresies withal; they were given us to live by.6
Religious beliefs in the first way shouldn’t, following James, serve to prove 
the truth of some doctrines about the existence or attributes of God and 
in so doing, condemn opposite ones, instead they have the function of 
giving orientation in central topics of life. To be justified in adopting 
some religious assumptions and to deny other ones under this respect 
doesn’t contradict our self-conception as matured rational thinking 
persons, to take these assumptions to be the foundation of living and our 
attitude towards central topics of life, if we think this to be a good or even 
the best option for ourselves. To this extent James’ position is an example 
of a modern tolerant subjective kind of understanding religion, which 
intends to allow everyone his individualistic pursuit of happiness, in 
religion also. The only limitation is to be tolerant against other beliefs.
But the main point in regard of the proponents, who deny the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs, is the assertion stated in addition by James 
in his early works in philosophy of religion, that it is more appropriate 
for the human mind to believe  – and in a  special broader sense of 
rationality – is even more rational to believe in God as not to do so. This 
broader concept of rationality includes the fact that the emotional and 
passional nature is an irreducible dimension of human rationality. The 
argumentation for this assertion lies in a special idea about the nature of 
beliefs, and the function they have in human life.
6 William James, ‘Is Life Worth Living?’, in: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, pp. 34-56 (pp. 51f.).
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II. SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY
For James – as in the tradition of pragmatism at all – beliefs are not to 
be understood as sentences which we categorize as true and false, but 
which have in the first way the function of giving orientation to our 
acting, feeling and thinking. The larger the set of firm belief, the more 
solid is the ground we walk on. For we all seek to have a maximum of 
firmness of a  largest as possible set of beliefs; every individual has, in 
the words of James, the inclination to dogmatize like a  pope. But, to 
take the metaphor further, the biggest counterpart of the pope, or more 
precisely of firm beliefs, is empirical evidence. Experiences which are 
opposed to some of our beliefs force us constantly to revise, or at least to 
correct, our view of reality. The more fundamental the experiences are, 
the more extensive are the consequences to the whole set of beliefs, and 
the higher the feeling of insecurity. The opposite state of mind, when the 
maximum of stability and firmness in accordance with our experiences 
is reached, which most people strive for, because it is the only state 
in which mind finds peace, James will name later on in his study The 
Varieties of Religious Experience ‘faith-state’, a concept introduced by the 
psychologist H. Leuba. In an earlier paper he speaks of a sentiment or 
feeling of rationality. In this paper, titled ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ 
(1879), James defends the thesis that a sentiment of rationality may only 
be reached if we hold the following assumptions to be true: that there 
is a God, that this God is the substance of all existent being, and that 
the essence of all existence is construed in such a  way that the world 
may come to a good ending. Without the idea of God as the origin and 
essence of all existence we were always confronted with ‘blighting breath 
of ultimate Why?’,7 what will never come to a solution entails that mind 
will never come to rest. Moreover we are, following James, creatures 
which have as acting beings a  teleological orientation on ethical and 
moral norms and the final idea of the Good in itself. Each ‘world-view’ 
which is opposed to that deep inclination (defeatism or fatalism, for 
example) transforms life into an irrational scenery, so the ‘sentiment of 
rationality’ will never come up, if we life on a ‘world-view’ like this. By 
reference to the early papers it is possible to give a more precise idea of 
James’ conception of religious belief: Religious beliefs can be described 
7 William James, ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’, in: The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy, pp. 57-89 (p. 64).
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as comprising a world view that entails the assumption of a great being 
which shares with human being the profound moral intuitions and cares 
about these intuitions. It is held to be the basis of all and fulfils the desire 
to have an  answer to the question of the wherefrom and whereto of 
individual life and also the world as a whole.
From the standpoint of the criticism of religion, it could be argued 
that James wrongfully assumes in this conception that the searching for 
answers to these questions is an  anthropological constant, for a  lot of 
people don’t care about them. They are pleased to live a good and decent 
life in the mortal world, and are not interested or even worried of what will 
come to pass at the end of days. I think this objection is a fundamental one, 
particularly if you think of the rising number of non-religious persons in 
most European countries. But even if you reply that these questions are 
always raised by reasoning itself, it is questionable if it is possible to satisfy 
this intellectual longing by deciding to believe in God.
Both objections couldn’t be defeated on the basis of ‘The Will to 
Believe’. James’ achievements in ‘The Will to Believe’ and other early 
papers on the philosophy of religion are only directed at the laggards 
who think it to be intellectual dishonest to adopt religious beliefs based 
on emotional longings and therefore forbid themselves such belief. The 
aim of James’ argumentation here is a therapeutic one: The psychologist 
James states that to ban religious beliefs out of life for rigid intellectual 
reason may cause a type of melancholy or ‘Weltschmerz’, which may, in 
the worst cast, drive someone into suicide.
In an apologetic respect, James refutes the claim that it is necessarily 
irrational to have religious beliefs. For always when we are confronted 
with a religious question in life we are confronted with a ‘genuine option’, 
which can only be decided on the basis of our volitional and emotional 
nature. Even the atheist or the ascetic in religious affairs, the agnostic, 
has to make his decision on the same grounds. For James it is obvious 
that the former will never be a lucky person, and because we all have the 
intention to get happy in some respect, the inner life of the disbeliever 
and the agnostic is going in a  wrong direction, which in some cases 
will end up in religious disease. In the words of Wittgenstein, it would 
be possible to summarize James’ pragmatic approach to that point as 
follows: ‘Believe in! It doesn’t hurt.’ (‘Glaube Du! Es schadet dir nicht.’)8 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen. Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlass 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1977), p. 33.
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Or in a more therapeutic version: ‘Don’t ban religious faith out of your 
life. That might hurt you.’
III. THE TRANSITION FROM ‘ASSENT’ TO ‘CONSENT’
Concerning the question of whether there is a  cognitive aspect of 
religious feeling, it is interesting to ask why some people, who can follow 
the argumentation up to that point, adopt religious beliefs, whereas 
others couldn’t believe although they do not think it would be dishonest 
to do so. Or to put it the other way around, the question is: When does 
affective inclination have the power to overcome all scruples and generate 
stable religious beliefs and hence a stable state of mind (faith-state)?
In his work The Principles of Psychology (1890, hereafter PP) James 
differentiate between to ‘assent to a  claim’ and to ‘consent to a  claim’. 
You may assent to religious beliefs without consenting to them. The 
transition from ‘assent’ to ‘consent’, according James, is mostly obscure. 
James’ assumption in the PP is that ‘nature’ sometimes works for us and 
produces instantaneous conversions for us, so within a moment we are 
highly convinced of something which until recently was remote to us.
Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, produces instanta-
neous conversions for us. She suddenly puts us in an active connection 
with objects of which she had till then left us cold. (PP, p. 948)9
It also is possible, following James in this chapter of the PP, to arbitrarily 
decide to adopt an  opinion and to treat it like a  true claim by letting 
it determine our feeling, acting and thinking. In this case too, nature 
will do her work for us by creating such a close connection between the 
object of the opinion and our habit that it will become a solid belief.
[...] we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, 
and keep acting as if it were real, and it infallibly ends by growing into 
such a connection with our life that it will become real. It will become so 
knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which 
characterize belief. (PP, pp. 948f.)
The latter type of the transition describes the ‘genuine option’ as 
demonstrated above, the first type of transition from ‘assent’ to ‘consent’ – 
the conversion – is central to James’ studies in the Varieties of Religious 
9 William James, The Principles of Psychology, The Works of William James vol. 8 
(Cambridge, MA/ London, Harvard University Press, 1981).
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Experience. Religious experience there will be defined in one respect as 
the inner process of the consent to religious beliefs or more precisely the 
consent to the claim that there is a ‘higher Self ’ we can get in personal 
touch with.
IV. THE COGNITIVE MEANING OF FEELING 
IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A REALISTIC INTERPRETATION 
OF THE EXPERIENCE OF TRANSCENDENCE
Stream of Thought
The basic structure of the argumentation laid down in the study The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (VRE), which compared to the mass of 
individual experiences of conversion mostly falls into the background, is 
also presented in the Principles of Psychology. In chapter nine of this major 
work, James introduces the concept of ‘stream of thought’ as a starting 
point for studying the manifold acts of thinking without the criterial 
distinction between the objective world and subjective perception. In this 
conception everything which can be an ‘object’ of the ‘stream of thought’ 
is real, or to say it in a different way: everything thought of is real. The 
meaning of ‘thought’ in this chapter is more like that of consciousness 
than that of intellectual capabilities like understanding or reasoning. 
‘Thought’ always refers to something beyond, something thought or to 
say it in the words of Edmund Husserl the ‘intentional object’ or ‘noema’. 
So every intentional object is a real object of the ‘stream of thought’, and 
what cannot be an object of the ‘stream of thought’ couldn’t be real if it 
would just be beyond thinking.
On the basis of this concept of reality, it is obvious that beliefs which 
are in the centre of our acting, thinking and feeling, are also real in 
a major level. To a certain degree we are able to control which beliefs 
come in the centre of our life. For example we can train ourselves to ban 
some worries or fears out of the centre, and so to minimize the influence 
upon us by focusing on more positive options. If these positive ideas 
have the power to motivate us to realize them, our ideas will become 
real in a literal sense. Naturally it is not possible to realize all the things 
we try to and normally we are able to evaluate what is possible to do 
and what will be prospectively in vain. So we usually don’t follow ideas 
which are totally odd, only because we would like to have them be true. 
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But I think James is also right when he notes that human beings as a rule 
tend to be exuberant when they are engaged to try to fulfil their deepest 
wishes. James even thinks that the struggle to realize those ideals that we 
consider to be highest goods is a profound and deeply inner impulse of 
a human being, and the lack of it would be worse than receiving a lot of 
setbacks. James then speaks of the ‘strong mood’, which is an essential 
part of happiness.
The more we are convinced of the worthy and goodness of our ideals 
the more they are present in our thinking, acting and feelings. Religious 
beliefs are, according to James, a kind of maximum case of an  idea of 
goodness or an  idea of ideal reality, which maybe could become real, 
but only with enormous exertion. But the ideal seems be to so highly 
worthwhile that it has the power to stay in the centre of a human’s acting, 
feeling and thinking, even it seems that only wonders could make them 
real. In his later work (A Pluralistic Universe, 1909) James develops the 
idea of God as ‘Great Companion’, who assists and helps mankind to 
fulfil this great and superhuman assignment to realize the Good. But 
in contrast to Feuerbach, James’ concept entails a  finite God and not 
an absolute superhuman God. It’s our helper and primus inter pares, but 
even he is powerless without the good will of mankind. In this respect 
James criticizes, like Feuerbach, the idealistic idea of God as the Absolute, 
but instead of denying the existence of God, he denies that we must think 
of him to be the Absolute.
Conversion – Religious Experience – Theism
But up to that point we are still on the level of autosuggestion. Religious 
faith thus seems to be nothing but a strong belief in something, which 
may be true or may just be an illusion. Even if there are good practical 
reasons to have such convictions, like to lead a happy life, particularly 
religious people would say that their faith involves something more. 
They do not only think that their faith fits to their way of life, but that 
it is grounded in a  real assumption of the world, in particular, of the 
origin and the final destination of the world and all being therein. This 
‘more’ even denotes the point where James left the basis of his early 
papers on popular philosophy and The Principles of Psychology when 
he comes on to his conclusions of the Varieties of Religious Experience. 
Religious experience is there described as the experience of a  total 
inner breakdown of effort of will. In this moment of volitional failure 
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and mental breakdown a  moment of reality suddenly appears, which 
opens up the range of reality in a significant way. It is not the experience 
of something more in the visible world, but of a new aspect of reality 
itself which previously seems to have been inaccessible. This experience 
distinguishes the believer in some religious doctrines from a true believer.
Religious experience, following James’ description in the VRE takes 
place in two stages: First the individual feels that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with itself and the world surrounding it. This 
feeling may be expressed in a consciousness of guilt or in a – considered 
from an out-standing perspective – one-sided look at the evil things in 
the world, like crime and misfortune. The individual at this stage still 
has the deep desire to believe that there is some balance between good 
and evil, and all evil things will come to a happy ending, but confronted 
with his one-sided experience of the world or/and himself, he can’t. This 
deep point of suffering at the end makes him feel divided within himself. 
He wants to believe in the good, but he can’t, because he and the world 
surrounding him is not good. This circulus vitiosus may lead into a deep 
despair, where everything becomes meaningless and the desire to die 
increases. Just in the deepest moment of suffering an unexpected turn 
of the inner life of the person takes place: The positive and life-affirming 
powers suddenly come to prevail and the individual gets more and more 
convinced that the true nature of reality is good.
The psychological model of explanation of this inner process, which 
James is providing in the VRE, is based on the theory of the subconscious. 
Following this explanation in the first state, the state of deep suffering, all 
the positive powers have been suppressed by the permanent impression 
of evil, so that at the end they were split off in the ‘subliminal self ’ so they 
couldn’t have any influence over the thinking, feeling or acting of the 
individual. This dissociation of a whole section of human being, which 
inhibits all positive sight of life, all feeling of joy or other positive feelings 
and paralyzes in the end all motivation of constructive acting, is called by 
James the ‘divided self ’. One way to get in contact with that subconscious 
region of the self is to get focused on the idea of Good, for in this way 
the so to speak synapses or the hidden region of the self will be activated. 
This type of religious conversion was described by James in ‘The Will to 
Believe’. Another way to get in contact with hidden regions is to block 
the negative forces; an outer stimulus has the power to overwhelm them, 
or otherwise the negative mental forces wear down so that the positive 
220 KATJA THÖRNER
powers hidden yet in the subconscious suddenly gain influence on the 
individual.
From the subjective point of view, the experience of conversion is 
often described by the individual  – given the cultural and intellectual 
context – as an encounter with another, higher person, called God. The 
individual, who describes his experience in religious terms, would say 
that it was God himself who, as the paragon of the Good, releases him. 
To this point of view the experience of the encounter with God causes the 
conversion and in that way redeemed the individual of his inner sickness. 
The psychological explanation does not contradict that religious point of 
view. But this ‘over-belief ’, as James calls it, transcends the boundaries of 
science for it supposes with God an ‘entity’ which by definition cannot be 
an object of scientific explanation. Science simply stops there. But from 
a philosophical point of view, according to James, we ‘have no excuse 
calling the unseen or mystical world unreal’ (VRE, p. 406), when we have 
to take into account that this world produces effects in the natural world.
From a  philosophical point of view it is also necessary to take 
into account that these causes are real, because they are a moment of 
experience for many individuals, who ordinarily are not under suspicion 
to confuse reality with their dreams or hopes. The main reason to take 
into account the literal truth of the experience of getting in contact 
with a higher personal entity, in James’s thinking, lies in his theory of 
reality, which was even developed within the boundaries of psychology 
as a natural science. In VRE James gives a  sketch of his philosophical 
theory of ‘pure experience’, which he developed in his later works and 
couldn’t be presented in this paper in its whole range. But it will suffice 
to take a look at the VRE. In chapter XX, ‘Conclusions’, James defines the 
experience as ‘the place’ where the reality of the world is given to us as 
a ‘full fact’.
A  conscious field plus its object as felt or thought of plus an  attitude 
towards the object plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs – 
such a concrete bit of personal experience may be a small bit, but it is 
a  solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a  mere abstract element 
of experience, such as the ‘object’ is when taken all alone. It is a  full 
fact, even though it be an insignificant fact; it is of the kind to which all 
realities whatsoever must belong; the motor currents of the world run 
through the like of it; it is on the line connecting real events with real 
events. (VRE, p. 393)
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If it is true that reality in the fullest sense ‘happens’ in concrete 
experience, it is clear that we cannot separate the existence of God from 
the experience of God. It is not possible to prove first that there is a God 
above, and then believe in it. Religious experience as the unit of the 
feeling of getting in contact with God plus the specific attitude to God 
plus the sense of being a self are connected, but different even from God 
is the ‘fons et origo’ of all religion. That there is no proof of the existence 
of God above the fact that there are individuals who have a feeling of its 
being present isn’t an argument against his existence at all. Moreover it 
is a crucial fact which philosophy has to take into account, if it claims to 
elaborate an idea of reality as a whole.
In the postscript to ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience’, James 
honours this philosophical assumption when he presents a  draft of 
a type of philosophical world-view, which takes account of the fact that 
human beings have religious experiences and there is no reason not 
to take them to be true. This world-view has to be a supernatural one, 
because religious beliefs involve concepts that transcend the world of 
natural science. Religions indeed appeal to a  special kind of reality of 
a personal nature.
So religion is more than a ‘rosy view’ of the world. It postulates facts 
(‘postulator of new facts’, VRE, p. 406.) that transcend the boundaries 
of the natural world as it is described in natural science. Different 
to his earlier works, where he justifies religious beliefs on the basis 
of pragmatic reason, in VRE  – and also in other later works like The 
Pluralistic Universe  – James argues on an  epistemological basis. The 
analysis and philosophical interpretation of religious experience ends 
up in a  critique of scientific materialism, which claims to include the 
whole range of reality. Scientific materialism neglects the subjective 
part of each experience and as a  result it presents the objective part 
as an abstract idea of reality, which is present to us in our experience. 
But to understand religious experience, you have to be more ‘radically 
empirical’ than science and develop a concept of world as a whole which 
makes it possible to consider religious experiences to be true.
[...] the total expression of human experience, as I  view it objectively, 
invincibly urges me beyond the narrow ‘scientific’ bounds. (VRE, p. 408)
In this respect religions and theologies present a  more refined world-
view than science does, because they emphasize also the inner subjective 
part of experience. What often is considered to be a ‘anachronism, a case 
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of “survival”, an atavistic relapse into a mode of thought which humanity 
in its more enlightened examples has outgrown’ by the critics of religion, 
from a really humanistic point of view could be seen to be a merit of 
religion: The assumption that there is a  God above allows space for 
the assumption that the divine meets the individual ‘on the basis of his 
personal concerns’ (VRE, p. 387).
CONCLUSION
Especially in his later work, James construes religious experience in 
a dedicated realistic way. In my opinion this is necessary, if one likes to 
base religious beliefs on feelings or emotions on the one hand and to 
avoid judging these beliefs as illusions on the other hand. For religious 
beliefs can’t be prooved in a  scientific manner, you need a  concept of 
reality which transcends the world of science. In science there is one 
moment which is in itself by definition not part of this world and that 
is the mental moment of experience wherein all science is founded. If 
you accept this origin, the field of reality will open up wide and there is 
no more reason to think of the experience of a higher self or God to be 
unreal, if a wide range of individuals all over the world and thousands of 
years had these experiences.
Maybe some critics of religion and atheists are quite aware of the 
consequences which a  true theism would entail. The assumption of 
a  supernatural personal God can’t be seen as further supplement to 
or behind the natural world, moreover it would change the whole 
naturalistic world-view as such.
But the realistic interpretation of theism is not the only way to 
speak of religion as being true. There is also a culturalistic view, which 
is for example preferred by Franz von Kutschera. He eliminates all 
supernatural elements, which Kutschera calls ‘mythological’, from 
religion or more precisely from Christianity. From this point of view 
religious experience isn’t to be seen as an experience which transcends the 
natural world. Under these premises feelings and emotions are nothing 
but epiphenomenons which may accompany religious belief, but will 
disappear in that stage of religiousness which Kutschera calls a ‘matured 
faith’. But if this kind of religious faith would have the power to fashion 
a whole life is a question which is raised by Kutschera himself at the end 
of his book: ‘A [second] obstacle to the mature Christianity may be that 
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religious faith has to be based deeply in the region of feeling and passion 
to be able to form a person’s life in all respects. Human beings are not 
only reasonable beings, the faculties of passion and will are important in 
the same way. But maturity is only an intellectual ideal. A mature faith is 
not able to address the feelings and longings of human being, not shape 
their experiences, not comfort mourning and not share their happiness ... 
Mythological religions with their legends and holy rituals immediately 
appeal to the realm of feeling and passion. Their interpretation of the 
world and history are comprehensible through experience. This basis of 
immediate is lost in the stage of maturity.’10 And this is the reason why 
James is voting for the ‘anachronistic’ type of religion.
But Kutschera also emphasizes that the ‘ideal of maturity’ didn’t aim 
for the ‘right of way to reason’. The aim is to have the individual freedom 
to handle his feelings and emotions, which presupposes to reflect them.
But it is also possible to interpret James’ achievements in ‘The Will to 
Believe’ from that point of view. Religious beliefs could be understood as 
a possibility for which there is no obvious reason. For they are not proven 
to be false; you have the free choice to adopt them or not. If one chooses 
to believe because he considered faith to be the best option for living, or 
on the basis of personal subjective experiences, he might do that. And 
in most cases, even in a time and environment where it is not natural or 
even obligatory to belief in God, he probably made this choice on the 
basis of some reflection, so that the idea of mature Christianity does not, 
from my point of view, contradict the acceptance of some mythological 
elements in it, which are able to appeal to our inner life of passion and 
deep concerns.
The instantaneous type of conversion James put in the centre of his 
study on the varieties of religion maybe isn’t that typical as he – growing 
up in a time and a region of the world where awakening-movements had 
10 Loose translation by the author of this paper. ‘Ein zweiter Einwand gegen ein 
mündiges Christentum lautet: Religiöser Glaube muss auch im Gefühl verankert sein, 
wenn er sein ganzes Leben bestimmen. Der Mensch ist kein reines Verstandeswesen, 
Fühlen und Wollen sind ebenso wichtig wie Denken. Mündigkeit ist jedoch ein bloß 
intellektuelles Ideal. Ein mündiger Glaube kann die Menschen nicht in ihrem Fühlen 
und Streben ansprechen, ihr Erleben nicht prägen, sie in ihrer Trauer nicht trösten und 
in ihrer Freude nicht begleiten ... Mythische Religionen sprechen das Gefühl mit ihren 
Bildern, Legenden und heiligen Handlungen unmittelbar an. Ihre Deutungen von Welt 
und Geschichte lassen sich im Erleben nachvollziehen. Diese Gefühlsunmittelbarkeit 
geht mit dem Schritt in die Mündigkeit verloren.’ (Franz von Kutschera, Was vom 
Christentum bleibt, p.142.)
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their origin – thought it to be. And maybe the idea of adopting religious 
beliefs by a cold blooded act isn’t a realistic case of becoming religious. 
However I think some general characteristics of the process of adopting 
religious beliefs are given in his studies: First: It is necessary to think of 
religious claims as assumptions or hypotheses that might be true even 
if not in a literal sense, or in the words of William James, they have to 
be considered as living options. Second: If you are convinced that it is 
always wrong to believe in something which has the power to touch your 
heart, you never will come to be religious believer for it seems to me that 
religious beliefs always are linked with a special taste which makes you 
feel more placid. Third: The confrontation with typical religious questions 
like that of the existence of God, of life after death, of evil and retributive 
justice will always worry human beings. Maybe not every person reaches 
a faith-state or maybe a faith-state isn’t such a stable state of mind, as one 
may think when reading the examples given by James. But to face up 
to these questions, even if one comes to atheistic answers at the end, is 
an honest and matured form of using your intellectual capacities.
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